So you’ve deployed your new VPS or cloud server and SSH is served up on port 22 with password authentication. If you’re reading this, you already know that’s entirely insecure and just begging to be attacked. I’ll detail my procedure for hardening SSH on Fedora Linux, the distro I run. This should also work on downstream RHEL and CentOS, and broadly speaking on any SSH server, though some bits may differ.
Network Security
Securing wired and wireless networks against intrusion.
Two Ways to Fully Disable WordPress XML-RPC
Back several years ago when XML-RPC attacks on WordPress were prevalent, I shared some techniques here for selectively countering such attacks. Most users, however, just want to shut XML-RPC off completely. They often land on the widely installed Disable XML-RPC plugin. This plugin unfortunately does not fully work. Let me show you why, share some better solutions, and update my unit testing code for Python 3 in the process.
Nmap Top Ports Frequencies Study
By default, Nmap scans the most common 1,000 TCP ports. How does it decide which ones, what coverage does that result in, and what are the ramifications for real world port scanning? Let’s look at the actual numbers behind Nmap’s top ports.
One More Check In on WordPress XML-RPC Fail2ban Traps
Just putting out an updated chart showing how this has performed through several additional months of operation. I’ve previously covered what’s happening here in detail when I began to sustain a high volume of attacks, when I implemented the fail2ban based countermeasures, and when I checked in on how the traps were performing four months ago.
Checking in on the Performance of WordPress XML-RPC Attack Countermeasures
Following up on my deployment of WordPress XML-RPC attack countermeasures a few months ago, let’s have a look at how effectively the traps have performed in live operation in the intervening time.
Countering WordPress XML-RPC Attacks with fail2ban
In my last post I began inquiring into the WordPress XML-RPC attacks I’ve been sustaining here on the site. Since then I’ve been further studying the threat and experimenting with responses, and I have now developed working countermeasures and cast them into live operation. These countermeasures involve forwarding telemetry out of WordPress for pickup by the fail2ban facility, allowing for the detection and banning of attackers trying to exploit xmlrpc.php. Where other recommendations call for disabling affected methods or the whole XML-RPC subsystem, my more refined techniques control attacks while maintaining the full service set in operation for valid procedure calls.
Network Attackers: Where In The World 3
Two previous rounds of analysis using IP geolocation with Whois (Part 1 and Part 2) revealed that 40% to 45% of network intrusion attempts arriving at my public-facing SSH port could be traced back to Chinese hackers, and 20% to 25% to attackers in Russia and Eastern Europe. The tally is now in from a third round of observations, boasting a significantly longer integration period (more than four months versus about six to seven weeks in the earlier rounds) and yielding plenty of interesting and even unexpected results.
Cyberwarfare Rages, Guess Where
Late breaking articles from the New York Times and Wall Street Journal this evening caught my eye, wherein one seriously pissed off Google Inc opens up a surprisingly hard line against Beijing:
Network Attackers: Where In The World 2
Time to tally up the new results since my last report on network intruder geolocation using Whois. Will the trend showing two-thirds of attackers as hailing from China, Russia and the former Soviet bloc hold for this new integration period? Place your bets.